Here's an interesting article in yesterday's newsletter from the Jamestown Foundation. (Actually I can't post the link because the Jamestown article hasn't been posted yet. The site hasn't been updated since Wednesday which is unusual).
While I was thinking and blogging that sites in Tbilisi were down because of everybody trying to view them, it seems it was more sinister than that.
Apparently the following sites were attacked:
the websites of the President of Georgia, Georgian Parliament, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Bank of Georgia, the English-language on-line news dailies The Messenger and www.civil.ge, as well as the on-line version of the popular Rustavi 2 television channel.
In addition, the websites of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Bank of Georgia were defaced with the digitally reformatted image of President Saakashvili superimposed on a collage of photos of Nazi leader Adolph Hitler (The New York Times, August 12; International Herald Tribune, August 13; The Washington Post, August 14; The Independent, August 17).
What's interesting is who came to the rescue. It seems a volunteer watchdog, the Shadowserver Foundation, is a group specializing in analyzing malicious activities on the Internet. We shall leave aside who might be interested in funding such a body, or even why it has to be left to a volunteer organisation.
The websites of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and www.civil.ge were temporarily accommodated with Google’s permission on Blogspot domain, which is better protected against a sustained DDOS* attack (The New York Times, August 12; Transitions Online, http://blogs.tol.org, August 15). On August 9 the President’s website and the on-line version of the Rustavi 2 television channel were transferred to the new host, Tulip Systems, Inc., an Atlanta-based Internet hosting company owned by the Georgia native Nino Doijashvili.
Estonia, where the NATO Cyber Defense Center (see EDM, May 15) is located, began to host the website of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and dispatched two information security specialists from its Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to assist the Georgian authorities (Wired/Danger Room, August 11; The Earth Times, www.earthtimes.org, August 11; IDG News Service, August 12; Rosbalt news agency, August 13).
According to a press statement released by Estonia’s State Center of Development of Information Systems, in addition to the website of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Estonia is now also hosting the websites of the National Bank of Georgia and the English-language on-line news portal www.civil.ge (www.lenta.ru, August 27; www.iToday.ru, August 27).
So it seems already there is a quick response mechanism in place for Russian cyber attacks. It's not clear whether this hosting abroad is still going on or not. If it is, it would explain why there is not much bandwidth available for ordinary Georgians at the moment, if all government traffic is using international connections instead of just domestic ones. The office internet is very slow, and my home internet has faded out altogether although all the lights are on in the right places in the modem. Occasionally I can piggyback on an unsecured wireless signal called "Default", but it tends to kick me off. Sorry, I wouldn't do it if my own connection was working.
The IT infrastructure in Georgia is already weak enough without that, as the article points out:
In terms of actual damage, the Russian cyber attack had a significant impact only on the timely dissemination of information from Georgia during the first five days of the conflict. Georgia’s relative backwardness with regard to the Internet availability--only 7 percent of the population has access to the Internet--turned out to be a blessing in disguise (Global Voices, www.globalvoicesonline.org, August 17).
According to the World Economic Forum, Georgia ranks 93rd among 122 nations in Internet use; and it holds 74th place out of 234 nations (behind Nigeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, and el Salvador) if judged in terms of the number of Internet addresses (International Herald Tribune, August 13; Defense News, August 18).
If Georgia had been more dependent on the Internet, the Russian cyber attack might have produced more dire consequences, as Russian hacktivists could have disrupted the energy, transportation, communications, and banking networks. It should be recalled here that the Russian cyber attack on far more advanced Estonia nearly brought its government and banking sector to a standstill in 2007, when irate Russian hacktivists launched on-line campaign in retaliation for the relocation of the Soviet-era World War Two monument.
It seems that Russia was not trying to disrupt civilian life as it could have simply bombed the power lines from the main hydro power station, Enguri. This installation, built in Soviet times, has its dam in Abkhazia and the control panel in Georgia proper. Of course, the buffer zone now goes straight through the turbines. So the Russians can simply take it over any time. Cut that off, and you can bring Georgia back to the 90s, when there was no electricity, and certainly no internet. Talking in our office, we agreed it was harder to live without internet than without electricity, though one depends on the other. So we are making plans to buy a generator, since we keep having power cuts anyway.
Coming back to the cyber war, one assumes that Russia has taken similar precautions to transfer its important websites to friendly websites in other countries, er like Nicaragua and Venezuela, or even to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, since no one will bother to cyber attack them. What is the cyber equivalent of "beyond the Urals" like during the Second World War.
This seems like something Vilhelm Konnander should know about, based on his last post
here.
Do we need to worry about cyber attacks from Iran and Osama bin Laden? Is that what he is up to plotting in the tribal areas?
*Distributed denial of service