And this year in Georgia we have ...

From the Jamestown Foundation archive:

7 May 2009  Increasing risk of Russian Intervention in Georgia

12 May 2009 Radical Georgian Opposition Considers Shift in Tactics

21 May 2009 Radical Opposition Threatens to Disrupt Georgian Transportation

29 May 2009 Moscow Playing with Multiple Options on Black Sea Pipelines

2 June 2009 U.N. Secretary-General Revises Report on Abkhazia under Russian Pressure

12 June 2009 Moscow Ready to Scuttle U.N. and OSCE Missions in Georgia

18 June 2009 Russian Military Chief Accuses Georgia of Preparing Aggression

Sounds familiar doesn't it?  

Similarities with last year                                   
Disillusionment with Saakashvili                         
Disorganisation of the Opposition (and now more angry)                     
Russian military activity in breakaway areas (and increased  informal militias)  
Ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Ineffectiveness of UN and OSCE monitoring  (no monitoring in breakaway areas)                                     
Russian military manoeuvres in the North Caucasus again in July
Holiday season coming up

Extra disruptive factors
Global financial crisis distracting the rest of the world
Sever financial trouble at home in Russia needs adventures abroad as distraction
President Obama still supporting Georgia even though Europe has gone cool
NATO manoeuvres held in Georgia
More trouble in Moldova and Ukraine
Increasing troubles in North Caucasus this month
Awareness of the lack of readiness of Russian army

From the 16 June Jamestown article we have the following:

The most dangerous period within which a new full-scale war with Georgia might occur will be from July 10 until after President Barack Obama visits Moscow in August, while the invasion forces are already deployed and poised for action, under the cover of "Kavkaz-2009." If Russian forces go into action, their objectives will be decisive.

The author of the 16 June article, Pavel Felgenhauer, continues that the Russian strategic objectives will be:

1. Regime change and the forceful demilitarization of Georgia, fully dismantling and disarming the regime-loyal Georgian army, border guards and special police forces.

2. Establishing a secure land corridor linking Russia to its strategically important military base in Armenia.

3. Transforming Georgia into a loose confederation of its many semi-independent regions with their regional king-pins, with a weak central government and without any national military-security forces. Russian military forces will be permanently stationed within the Georgian confederation, ensuring influence, control of energy supply corridors to the Caspian and Central Asia, and ending the country's aspirations to join NATO.

The first objective will hardly be difficult given the performance of the Georgian army last year, since the global financial crisis has meant that it could not be re-equipped and it can hardly be much better trained now.  While the Russian army was not better equipped or much better disciplined, it comes with bigger numbers and fire power.

The second objective is essential, as currently not only is there no land access, but Georgia also controls the supply of gas to Armenia, and we all know that gas can be used as a political weapon.

The ease of achieving the third objective was amply demonstrated last August when Georgia was effective cut in two after the advance up to the main east-west highway at Gori, which also houses a large military base.  The advance on Tbilisi will be aided by the new motorway being constructed as part of Georgia's ambition to be a transportation transit corridor, to which it is dedicating most of its development resources, without considering the risks of putting all its eggs in one basket.

Felgenhauer continues that the Russian operational objectives will be to:

1. To engage and fully decimate the most capable Georgian government forces (artillery and special forces, including police special forces) in decisive battles.

2. To isolate Georgia from any possible external aid by taking under control its ports, major roads and airfields. One of the prime military targets of any future campaign could be the cluster of airfields and airstrips east of Tbilisi (Vaziani).

3. When the regular Georgian army, police and security forces are smashed, the existing political internal tensions could precipitate the disintegration of the present unified Georgian state. The international community may eventually leave Russia to manage the ensuing mess.

Russia managed to bomb Poti and the military airports last year without any problem. Felgenhauer has already described here in February the plan for taking Tbilisi so it is already well known.

And what else is reassuring?

With its present array of weapons, training and capabilities, the Georgian forces do not appear sufficient to deter Russia. The international community is doing almost nothing, apparently hoping that marginalizing Georgia and charming Russia is the best possible policy. The U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs Philip H. Gordon has confirmed that the U.S. will not provide Georgia with any defensive or other weapons (RIA Novosti, June 9). This development has been eagerly awaited in Moscow.

And I forgot: this year we don't have any distractions like the Olympic Games.  Luckily Joe Biden is coming to Georgia for 20-24 July.  That should give us till the end of July at least.

If that's not enough for you, I recommend this week's International Crisis Group report here, encouragingly titled "Georgia-Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous".  That's only South Ossetia, apparently there's worse to come on Abkhazia.